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1959] RECENT CASES
taining the intent of the parties, arrived at from a consideration of the con-
veying instrument's terms and attending circumstances.' 5  However, when,
as in the instant case, the parties use clear language such as: "... one-eighth
of all the oil and gas which may be produced ... ," it is submitted that such
language should be held to result in the creation of a royalty interest. To
hold otherwise is to ignore the usual operative effect given such language by
the courts.
DAVID C. JOHNSON.
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS - RAILROADS-RIGHT OF WAY ASSESSMENT LIABILITY
DEPENDS ON PRESENT oR FUrURE BENEFITS. - Planitiff railrqad's main, line
right of way ran adjacent and parallel to two portions of defendant's city
street that was repaved. Plaintiff was assessed more than 50% of the total
amount in the special assessment repaving district. The Michigan Supreme
Court held, five justices dissenting, that the railroad failed to show that no
benefits inured to the right of way at the present time or in the foreseeable
future and was therefore liable for the paving assessment. New York R.R. v.
Detroit, 93 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. 1959).
Most courts hold that property of a railroad may be made liable by assess-
ment for local improvements.' The peculiar character of a railroad right of
way gives rise to special problems in applying special assessments against it.
2
There is conflict of authority as to whether a special assessment may be en-
forced against a railroad right of way. 3
Many courts hold that a railroad right of way is liable for assessment for
local improvements only if it can be said to be benefited by the improve-
ments. 4 This does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.' But if the cost
of paving is without any compensating advantage and if the statute requires
as a basis for its operation the existence of benefits, then the assessment
amounts to confiscation.6 An assessment by proper authority being prima facie
valid, the burden is on the railroad to show that it is not benefited.7 There is
a split of authority as to whether the court may say as a matter of law that a
right of way does not receive a benefit.' Some states hold that a special
assessment should be upon the basis of benefits to the property assessed from
the improvements and not upon the number of square feet in the property, or
15. Dabney-Johnson Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal.2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935); Hickey
v. Dirks, 156 Kan. 326, 133 P.2d 107 (1943); Pure Oil Co. v. Kindall, 116 Ohio St.
188, 156 N.E. 119 (1927).
1. E.g., Carolina & N.W. BR. v. Clover, 46 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1931) (Benefit not
necessary); Cowart v. Union Paving Co., 216 Cal. 375, 14 P.2d 764 (1932).
2. Cf. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Seattle, 46 Wash. 674, 91. Pac. 244 (1907).
3. See, Town of Clayton v. Colorado & S. By., 51 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1931) (Solely
a question of state policy).
4. See Northern Pac. R.R. v. Grand Forks, 73 N.W.2d 348, (N.D. 1955); Thomas
v. Kansas City Southern By., 261 U.S. 481 (1923).
5. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Richland County, 28 N.D. 172, 148 N.W. 545 (1914);
Louisville & N. By. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905).
6. See Georgia R. & Electric Co. v. City of Decatur, 295 U.S. 165 (1934).
7. Chicago, R. I. & P. By. v. Wright County Drainage Dist., 175 Iowa 417, 154
N.W. 888 (1916).
8. See, e.g., Long Island By. v. Hylan, 940 N.Y. 199, 148 N.E. 189 (1925) (no
benefit declared as a matter of law); Contra, Grand Rapids v. Grand Trunk By. System,
214 Mich. 1, 182 N.W. 424 (1921) (Matter for the jury).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
upon the street frontage9 Future benefits that will sustain an "assessment
may consist of gains from increases in traffic reasonably expected to result
from the improvement, but they may not be based upon mere speculation or
conjecture.10 One state has expressly provided by statute that the right of
way of a railroad shall be subject to special assessment for street improve-
ments."
In a great number of cases the liability of a railroad right of way for assess-
ments has been denied on the ground that no benefit to the right of way has
resulted, or will result from the improvement, although it is evident that had
the improvement been beneficial, such property would have been held liable.12
In some jurisdictions the power to assess a railroad right of way is denied on
the ground that it is land appropriated to a public use.' 3 Railroad right of
ways are exempt from street improvement assessments only where use thereof
is solely and permanently for railroad purposes.' 4 The system and policy of
each state enter largely into the question and give to it a local character.15
North Dakota would apparently follow the dissenting opinion. The law
seems to be fairly well settled in North Dakota that a right of way is not
subject to special assessments for the reason that no future benefits can be
derived to a right of way committed to a definite use.'6
ROBERT K. SEVERSON.
9. See Johnston City v. Chicago & E. I. By., 289 Ill. 407, 124 N.E. 568 (1919);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Grand Forks, 73 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1955) (In North Dakota
special assessments must be apportioned according to benefits. The foot frontage method
can be used only where benefits conferred upon the assessed property are equal and
uniform.).
10. See Kansas City Southern By. v. Road Improv. Dist., 266 U.S. 379 (1924).
11. Iowa Code Annot. § 391.40 (1949).
12. See, e. g., Long Island By. v. Hylan, 206 N.Y. Supp. 239 (1924); Minneapolis &
St. L. By. v. Lindquist, 119 Iowa 144, 93 N.W. 103 (1903).
13. See, e.g., Boston v. Boston & A. R.R., 170 Mass. 95, 49 N.E. 95 (1898).
14. See City of Barre v. Barre & Chelsa By., 97 Vt. 398, 123 Ati. 427 (1924).
15. Town of Clayton v. Colorado & S. By., 51 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1931); See Chi-
cago, M. & St. P. By. v. Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 506, 62 N.W. 417 (1895).
16. See Northern Pac. By. v. Grand Forks, 73 N.W.2d 348, (N.D. 1955).
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